



**Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission
(RJMEC)**

REPORT

BY

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**ON THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REVITALISED
AGREEMENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

FOR THE PERIOD

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List of Acronyms

<i>AU</i>	<i>African Union</i>
<i>AUC</i>	<i>African Union Commission</i>
<i>AU PSC</i>	<i>African Union Peace and Security Council</i>
<i>CoS</i>	<i>Council of States</i>
<i>CSOs</i>	<i>Civil Society Organizations</i>
<i>CRA</i>	<i>Compensation and Reparation Authority</i>
<i>CTRH</i>	<i>Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing</i>
<i>CTSAMVM</i>	<i>Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism</i>
<i>DDR</i>	<i>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</i>
<i>IDPs</i>	<i>Internally Displaced Persons</i>
<i>IGAD</i>	<i>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</i>
<i>ITGoNU</i>	<i>Incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity</i>
<i>JDB</i>	<i>Joint Defense Board</i>
<i>JMCC</i>	<i>Joint Military Ceasefire Commission</i>
<i>JTSC</i>	<i>Joint Transitional Security Committee</i>
<i>JRC</i>	<i>Judicial Reform Committee</i>
<i>MVTs</i>	<i>Mobile Verification Teams</i>
<i>NCAC</i>	<i>National Constitutional Amendment Committee</i>
<i>NCRC</i>	<i>National Constitutional Review Commission</i>
<i>NEC</i>	<i>National Elections Commission</i>
<i>NSS</i>	<i>National Security Service</i>
<i>NUF</i>	<i>Necessary Unified Forces</i>
<i>PFMRS</i>	<i>Public Financial Management Reform Strategy</i>
<i>PPC</i>	<i>Political Parties Council</i>
<i>R-ARCSS</i>	<i>Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan</i>
<i>RJMEC</i>	<i>Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission</i>
<i>RTGoNU</i>	<i>Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity</i>
<i>SDSR</i>	<i>Strategic Defense and Security Review</i>
<i>SPLM-IO</i>	<i>Sudan People's Liberation Movement-In Opposition</i>
<i>SSPDF</i>	<i>South Sudan People's Defence Force</i>
<i>TNL</i>	<i>Transitional National Legislature</i>
<i>TNLA</i>	<i>Transitional National Legislative Assembly</i>
<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</i>
<i>UNHCR</i>	<i>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</i>

Executive Summary

This RJMEC Quarterly Report highlights the status of the implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) for the period 1st January to 31st March 2026, and builds on the previous RJMEC quarterly reports. The report assesses the recent developments across political/governance, security, humanitarian, economic, and transitional justice, and constitution-making processes. The report further highlights key observations, challenges facing implementation of the R-ARCSS, and concludes with actionable recommendations.

Implementation of the governance provisions recorded only minimal progress during the reporting period. Notwithstanding this slow pace, several political developments were noted, including RTGoNU's proposal to amend certain provisions of the R-ARCSS, RJMEC's consultations on the proposal, the Presidential appointment of a leadership body to guide election-related dialogue, the AU C5 Plus Summit on South Sudan and its Declaration, ongoing changes in responsibility-sharing arrangements within RTGoNU, the continued detention and trial of Dr Riek Machar and co-accused SPLM/A-IO officials, and limited progress in preparations for the December 2026 elections.

Violations of the Permanent Ceasefire persisted between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO and allied forces, despite repeated calls for de-escalation and dialogue. CTSAMVM recorded 133 alleged violations, including armed clashes, crimes against civilians, sexual and gender-based violence, forced displacement, and occupation of civilian areas by armed forces. The highest incidence rates were reported in the Ayod, Pigi, Nyirol, and Akobo counties of Jonglei State. No progress was recorded on Transitional Security Arrangements during the quarter.

CTSAMVM continued to face serious operational limitations, working with only three Monitoring and Verification Teams across the country, which affected timely and comprehensive monitoring, verification and reporting. However, the body resumed its regular meetings, including two Technical Committee meetings and two Board meetings during the quarter.

The humanitarian situation deteriorated further, driven by renewed fighting in parts of the country, particularly Jonglei State. Akobo emerged as a major flashpoint, with a security incident involving a UNMISS convoy, a 72-hour ultimatum issued by the SSPDF ordering civilians, UNMISS personnel, UN agencies, and NGOs to leave the area, clashes between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO, civilian casualties, looting of markets, NGO compounds, and Akobo Hospital, and new internal displacement. These developments significantly worsened the environment for civilians' protection and humanitarian aid.

Oil production in the Dar Blend and Nile Blend fields remained stable at an average of 155,000 barrels per day and continued to support government finances. However, oil revenue reduced because the RTGoNU used its entitlement to offset prior budget advances obtained at discounted rates. Non-oil revenue improved, mainly through private sector income tax and customs duties, while the South Sudan Revenue Authority advanced reforms such as digitalised duty exemptions, anti-smuggling measures, infrastructure expansion, and Digital Tax Stamps.

Despite these improvements, revenue mobilization remains constrained by outdated tax laws, base erosion and profit shifting practices, and weak alignment with regional frameworks. The draft FY 2025/2026 National Budget prioritizes stabilization and recovery through resumed oil exports, but inflation and exchange-rate pressures remain high. The budget was also submitted late and did not fully comply with public financial management legal requirements.

Implementation of Phase I of the Public Financial Management Reform Strategy made partial progress, with gains in technical reforms but limited advancement in politically sensitive areas. Weak enforcement, leadership turnover, and high dependence on donor support continue to undermine sustainability. Progress on enterprise development also remained limited, as the Women's and Youth Enterprise Development Bills had yet to be tabled before the national Parliament.

Limited progress was recorded in the establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing. In January 2026, the Selection Panel submitted nominees to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs after a competitive process involving public applications, shortlisting, and interviews. However, the names of the four nominees have not yet been made public as required by the CTRH Act, and the Executive has not yet submitted the nominees to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly for vetting and approval.

At the regional level, the African Union Commission advanced recruitment of three non-South Sudanese CTRH commissioners and is expected to submit a shortlist to the RTGoNU for selection. However, no progress was recorded on the Hybrid Court for South Sudan and the Compensation and Reparations Authority.

Some progress was made in the permanent constitution-making process. The reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission continued civic education and public consultations across the States and Administrative Areas. Since the public launch of the process in March 2025, consultations have been completed in all States and one Administrative Area, while work was ongoing in Pibor. Ruweng and Abyei remained to be covered in this phase.

During the quarter, RJMEC received RTGoNU's proposal to amend certain provisions of the R-ARCSS, with the stated aim of delinking constitution-making and census processes from the December 2026 elections. After wide consultations with its members and stakeholders, RJMEC communicated the outcomes to the RTGoNU. Key outcomes included concerns regarding the prevailing political and security context, the procedure followed in initiating the amendments and their far-reaching implications given that some proposals go beyond the stated justification of enabling elections and seek to delink R-ARCSS and TCRSS, 2011, as amended and nullify its supremacy. The RJMEC therefore made proposals on how the amendments could be done without jeopardising the R-ARCSS, in a letter dated 26th February 2026. RJMEC still awaits the RTGoNU consideration on this matter.

The key observations from the report point to the constraints facing the implementation, primarily due to persistent political stalemate, insecurity and absence of a sustained cessation of hostilities, deep mistrust among the Parties, compounded by unilateral actions. Progress on key transitional benchmarks and reforms remained slow, exacerbated

by limited time, capacity gaps, and funding constraints. In order to halt further deterioration and restore confidence in the peace process, there is an urgent need for an urgent cessation of hostilities, combined with the commencement of an inclusive dialogue in line with the AU C5 Plus Declaration. Without these steps, the risks of further political fragmentation, and renewed large-scale violence will continue to increase, with serious implications for national and regional stability.

Recommendations

In light of the above, the report proposes the following measures for consideration by the Parties to the Agreement and relevant stakeholders, including the Executive of the RTGoNU, TNL, IGAD, the African Union, and the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan, to reinforce adherence to the R-ARCSS, mitigate the risk of renewed conflict, and support the timely conduct of elections at the end of December 2026:

a. To the Parties to the Agreement and Relevant Stakeholders:

- Renew commitment to full implementation of outstanding Agreement tasks, including the allocation of adequate and predictable funding to Agreement institutions and mechanisms; and
- engage in a dialogue and recommit to the Permanent Ceasefire and consider a proactive approach to accelerate the unification of forces in order to facilitate the planned elections at the end of 2026.

b. To the Executive of the RTGoNU:

- Strictly adhere to the legal procedure for amending the R-ARCSS, in particular Article 1.9.4 on initiating amendments to the R-ARCSS and follow the due process under Article 8.4;
- de-escalate tensions and urgently embark on inclusive and meaningful dialogue to address the current political/security deadlocks and by consensus agree on a practical and expedited roadmap to elections by the end of the Transitional Period;
- avail sufficient funding to the NEC, security mechanisms, as well as to the NCRC in a timely manner to enable it to roll out the civic education and public consultation campaigns to all parts of the country;
- expedite implementation of the JRC report and its recommendation, especially the review and amendment of the Judiciary Act and reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to implement the reforms;
- expedite the return of the controversial National Security Services Act to the TNLA for reconsideration;
- collate all the seven nominees for the CTRH and submit their names to the TNLA for vetting and approval and eventual appointment by the President; and
- consider providing dedicated funding for the implementation of Transitional Security Arrangements.

c. To the TNL:

- Continue exercising an enhanced oversight role to ensure that any proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS are subjected to broad, inclusive consultation involving all signatory Parties, stakeholders, and guarantors. In that regard, the TNL should guard against unilateral actions that risk undermining the integrity and core commitments of the Agreement, particularly those relating to political inclusivity and elections;
- support an all-inclusive political dialogue aimed at de-escalating tensions and addressing the prevailing political impasse in line with the recent AU C5 Plus Declaration;
- prioritise the passage of election-related legislation and ensure adequate budgetary allocations to the National Elections Commission to enable timely and credible preparations for the December 2026 elections;
- enhance its oversight role in relation to the protection of civilians and humanitarian access, including through regular hearings and engagements with relevant ministries and humanitarian actors, to ensure that legislative action supports improved humanitarian conditions; and
- expedite the enactment of the NGO Amendment Bill to create the necessary civic and political space needed for the conduct of elections.

d. To IGAD:

- Consider convening an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting on the deteriorating political and security situation in South Sudan and guide the RTGoNU on much-needed steps to address and restore full adherence and implementation of the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit, including the matter of amendments to the R-ARCSS;
- consider undertaking a joint IGAD ministerial visit to South Sudan to collectively engage with the leadership of the Parties to the R-ARCSS and RTGoNU as guarantor, to follow up on IGAD's recommendations to the RTGoNU;
- continue urging the SSPDF and SPLA-IO leadership to immediately de-escalate tensions, disengage their forces and return to their pre-incident positions;
- launch a truly inclusive political dialogue among signatory parties to reach consensus on the nature, sequencing, and modalities of the elections. In that regard, further engage the non-signatory groups to ensure inclusivity and sustainability of the peace process; and
- urge the RTGoNU to reverse unilateral decisions that contravene the provisions of the R-ARCSS.

e. To the African Union:

- Pursuant to the AU C5 Plus Declaration, the AU and IGAD to consider using their joint leverage on the leadership in South Sudan to encourage them to urgently de-escalate tensions, cease hostilities, and stop actions that result in a return to all-out war;

- avail effective support to the appointed AU High Representative to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea to expedite the convening of an inclusive political dialogue among signatory parties to reach consensus on the nature, sequencing, and modalities of the scheduled elections;
- engage non-signatory groups to ensure inclusivity in the political dialogue and sustainability of the peace process;
- the AUC to consider submitting the names of the six CTRH nominees to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for the RTGoNU's approval;
- the AUC to further encourage expeditious establishment and funding of the R-ARCS transitional justice institutions to help bring about national reconciliation; and
- encourage the AUC to take proactive steps in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan.

f. To the United Nations:

- The members of the Security Council to consider undertaking periodic field visits to Juba to engage with the Parties to the R-ARCSS and the RTGoNU in the pursuit of durable peace in the Republic of South Sudan;
- the Security Council should urge all Parties to immediately cease hostilities, de-escalate tensions, and fully adhere to the Permanent Ceasefire as a prerequisite for stabilising the political and security situation;
- the Council should encourage and support an inclusive political dialogue, consistent with the AU C5 Plus Declaration, to address the current political impasse and outstanding issues within the framework of the R-ARCSS; and
- further, the Council should continue to press for improved protection of civilians, unhindered humanitarian access, and accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including pressing for the removal of administrative and security-related impediments to humanitarian access.

g. To the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan:

- Consider supporting an inclusive political dialogue, in line with the African Union C5 Declaration, as a means of fostering consensus among South Sudanese stakeholders on critical transitional and elections-related matters;
- International Partners are urged to scale up and sustain flexible humanitarian assistance to communities affected by conflict, displacement, and food insecurity in order to address immediate protection needs, ensure access to basic services, and mitigate the humanitarian consequences of ongoing insecurity; and
- further consider the provision of technical and logistical support to the NCRC and the constitution-making process, including by directly funding some of the critical mechanisms and civic education.

I. Introduction

1. This report covers the status of implementation of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) during the period 1st January to 31st March 2026 and builds on previous reports numbers 001/19 - 030/26 since the R-ARCSS was signed on 12th September 2018. It also highlights the engagements of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) in the fulfilment of its oversight, monitoring and evaluation mandate within the R-ARCSS; and concludes by providing key recommendations to the Parties and Stakeholders to the R-ARCSS, the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU), the Transitional National Legislature (TNL), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), the United Nations and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan.
2. Regarding the implementation of the provisions of the governance chapter of the R-ARCSS, the report notes that progress has been minimal during the reporting period. The slow progress notwithstanding, recent political developments were observed during the quarter. These include a proposal by the RTGoNU to amend some provisions of the R-ARCSS submitted to RJMEC for its consent; wide consultations undertaken by the RJMEC on the proposed amendments and submission of outcomes to the RTGoNU for further consideration; appointment of the leadership body to lead dialogue on elections; the convening of the Summit of the AU C5 Plus on the situation in South Sudan and its Declaration; ongoing changes in the responsibility-sharing arrangements within the RTGoNU, and continued detention and trial of H.E Dr Riek Machar, First Vice President and co-accused SPLM/A-IO officials, limited progress towards preparations for the conduct of elections in 2026, among others.
3. In terms of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA), the report notes that violations of the Permanent Ceasefire have persisted between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO and its allies, despite calls for the leadership of the RTGoNU and the SPLA-IO to dialogue and de-escalate the tensions. Notably, CTSAMVM recorded 133 alleged violations, involving armed clashes, crimes against civilians, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), forced displacement of civilians and the occupation of civilian areas by armed forces. These are yet to be investigated. Although violations were reported in most geographic regions of the country, their highest concentration were in Ayod, Pigi, Nyirol and Akobo Counties of Jonglei State.
4. The report further notes that CTSAMVM operated with only three (03) Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) throughout the country, making it extremely challenging to monitor, investigate and report accurately and timely on all violations. It is, however, encouraging to note that CTSAMVM resumed its regular meetings with two (02) CTSAMVM Technical Committee and two (02) Board meetings held during the quarter. However, no progress has been made on Transitional Security Arrangements during the quarter.
5. The humanitarian situation in the country continued to deteriorate as a result of various factors, including renewed fighting in some parts of the country, including Jonglei State. Akobo became the center of a rapidly escalating security and humanitarian crisis with a security incident on the UNMISS convoy traveling from Akobo to Pibor, a 72-hour ultimatum issued by the SSPDF, ordering civilians, UNMISS personnel, UN agencies,

and NGOs to leave Akobo ahead of a planned military operation, clashes between SSPDF and SPLA-IO, and civilian casualties, looting of markets, NGO compounds, and Akobo Hospital and internal displacements.

6. On Resource, Economic and Financial Management, the report notes that oil production in the Dar Blend and Nile Blend fields remained stable at an average of 155,000 barrels per day, continuing to support government finances. However, oil revenues were reduced as the RTGoNU used its entitlement to offset prior budget advances obtained at discounted rates.
7. Non-oil revenue performance improved, driven mainly by private sector income tax and customs duties. The South Sudan Revenue Authority made progress through digitalized duty exemptions, anti-smuggling measures, infrastructure expansion, and the rollout of Digital Tax Stamps. Nevertheless, revenue collection remains constrained by outdated tax laws, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting practices, and misalignment with regional frameworks.
8. The Draft FY 2025/2026 National Budget prioritizes economic stabilization and recovery through resumed oil exports, with strong growth projected in the oil sector. Inflation and exchange-rate pressures persist, and the budget was submitted late and did not fully comply with public financial management legal requirements.
9. Implementation of Phase I of the Public Financial Management Reform Strategy achieved partial success, with advances in technical reforms but limited progress in politically sensitive areas. Weak enforcement, leadership turnover, and heavy reliance on donor funding continue to undermine sustainability. Progress on enterprise development remains limited, as the Women's and Youth Enterprise Development Bills have yet to be presented to the national Parliament.
10. On Transitional Justice, the report notes that limited progress was recorded in the establishment of the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH). In January 2026, the Selection Panel submitted nominees to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs following a competitive process involving public applications, shortlisting, and interviews. However, the Panel has not yet publicly released the names of the four nominees, as required by the CTRH Act, and the Executive has yet to submit the nominees to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) for vetting and approval.
11. At the regional level, the African Union Commission (AUC) advanced the process for the recruitment of three non-South Sudanese CTRH commissioners and is expected to submit a shortlist to the RTGoNU for selection. No progress was registered during the reporting period towards the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS) and the Compensation and Reparations Authority (CRA).
12. Regarding the permanent constitution-making process, some progress was recorded during the reporting period. The reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) continued its civic education and public consultation activities across the States and Administrative Areas. Following the public launch of the process in March 2025, the NCRC completed the first phase of consultations in all the States and one Administrative Area. By the end of the quarter, consultations were underway in Pibor, with Ruweng and Abyei Administrative Areas yet to be completed in this phase.

13. During the quarter, RJMEC received RTGoNU's proposal for some amendments to the R-ARCSS for RJMEC's consent, pursuant to Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS. The stated aim of the proposal is to delink constitution-making and census processes from the December 2026 elections. Following receipt of the proposals, the RJMEC conducted wide consultations over the proposed matter and communicated the outcomes to the RTGoNU. Key outcomes included serious concerns expressed over the prevailing context of violations of the Agreement, procedure for its initiation and the far-reaching implications of some of the proposed amendments, which go beyond enabling, such as delinking the R-ARCSS from the TCRSS, 2011 (as amended) and annulling its sanctity and supremacy.
14. The key observations from the report point to the constraints facing the implementation, primarily due to persistent political and insecurity stalemate, and absence of a sustained cessation of hostilities, deep mistrust among the Parties, compounded by unilateral actions. Progress on key transitional benchmarks and reforms remained slow, exacerbated by limited time, capacity gaps, and funding constraints. At the same time, a deteriorating humanitarian and protection environment and continued impunity for human rights violations eroded public trust and heightened the risk of further instability. In order to halt further deterioration and restore confidence in the peace process, there is an urgent need for an urgent cessation of hostilities, combined with the commencement of an inclusive dialogue in line with the AU C5 Plus Declaration. Without these steps, the risks of further political fragmentation, and renewed large-scale violence will continue to increase, with serious implications for national and regional stability.
15. This report is therefore structured as follows: Section I provides an overview of the report, followed by Section II, with thematic analysis of the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS, Section III highlights key observations and recommendations to the Parties and Stakeholders to the R-ARCSS, the RTGoNU, the TNLA, IGAD, African Union, United Nations and International Partners and Friends of South Sudan. Section IV provides the conclusion of the report.

II. Status of Implementation of the Transitional Tasks of the R-ARCSS

Chapter 1: Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity

16. In terms of the status of implementation of the provisions of the governance chapter of the R-ARCSS, progress has been minimal throughout the quarter. Recent political developments included, *inter-alia*, the submission of proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS by the RTGoNU to RJMEC for the latter's consent; consultations of the RJMEC members and the regional guarantors on the proposal and submission of the outcomes to the RTGoNU for consideration; the AU C5 Plus Declaration on the situation in South Sudan; ongoing unilateral changes in the political responsibility-sharing arrangements within the RTGoNU, and ongoing trial of Dr Riek Machar, FVP and seven co-accused SPLM/A-IO officials; limited progress towards preparations for the conduct of elections in 2026, among others as described hereunder.

Recent Political Developments

Proposed amendment to the R-ARCSS

17. On the 15th January 2026, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs (MoJCA) of the Revitalised Transitional Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) formally submitted a set of proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS for RJMEC's consideration and endorsement, pursuant to Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS. The stated aim of the proposal is to delink constitution-making and census processes from the December 2026 elections.
18. In its submission, the RTGoNU underscored the following justification of the proposed amendments: that the Permanent Constitution Making Process cannot be completed before the December 2026 elections deadlines; that the Presidency and Parties Signatory to the Agreement had consensus to move forward with the elections; and that there would be no more extension. The RTGoNU further expressed a commitment that implementation of all ongoing and other pending transitional tasks of the R-ARCSS would be continued after the elections.
19. Following receipt of the aforementioned proposals from the RTGoNU, the RJMEC leadership formally acknowledged receipt of the document and informed the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs of its planned consultations with members over the matter, and that would guide RJMEC's action accordingly. The RJMEC Secretariat critically analysed the proposals and their implication, noting that there are ten (10) proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS, out of which only four (04) are substantive, and six (06) are consequential. The four (04) substantive proposed amendments include the following provisions of the R-ARCSS:
- 19.1. Article 1.2.5 of the R-ARCSS on TCRSS to delink the Permanent Constitution from the conduct of elections and ending the transition;
- 19.2. Article 1.2.14 of the R-ARCSS to repeal the conduct of Population and Housing Census;
- 19.3. Article 8.2 of the R-ARCSS to delink the R-ARCSS from the TCRSS; and
- 19.4. Article 8.3 of the R-ARCSS to repeal the Supremacy of the R-ARCSS.

20. Of the proposed amendments, only the first two proposals are deemed to relate to the conduct of elections, and the justifications provided. The other two are deemed to nullify the R-ARCSS, end its supremacy, as well as IGAD's oversight role as the Regional Guarantor.
21. Pursuant to the need to consult widely on the proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS, the RJMEC leadership consulted with all RJMEC members, namely the representatives of Parties to R-ARCSS, Other South Sudanese Stakeholders and Adherents, the Regional Guarantors, and the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan. Within the region, the RJMEC leadership held consultations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti and Chairperson of IGAD Council of Ministers, the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan; the Ambassadors of the AU C5 member states resident in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Executive Secretary of IGAD, and non-resident international Ambassadors accredited to the Republic of South Sudan but based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
22. Whereas some stakeholders welcomed the prospects of the amendments making elections possible, serious concerns were raised with regard to the context in which it was proposed – namely, ongoing systematic violation of the R-ARCSS, and the lack of inclusion of the SPLM/A-IO allied to the detained First Vice President, Dr Riek Machar Teny. Further, the majority contended that the R-ARCSS was not only about the conduct of elections, but much more about critical peacebuilding and democratic governance reforms, which remain pertinent, pre-and post-elections, and that these reforms must not be abandoned.
23. It was also evident that not all the signatory Parties of the R-ARCSS were involved in the decision-making initiating the proposed amendments, and some of the Parties seemed unaware of their full implications. In particular, the SPLM/A-IO party allied to Dr Riek Machar, informed that they were not consulted, that many of their representatives have been unilaterally removed from most portfolios and were therefore not represented in the meetings of the Presidency and the Council of Ministers of the RTGoNU, which endorsed the proposed amendments.
24. Overall, the stakeholders therefore recommended that amendments to the R-ARCSS, if any, should be properly initiated pursuant to Article 1.9.1.4 of the R-ARCSS and be limited to specific provisions absolutely necessary to enable the conduct of a free, fair, credible and peaceful elections.
25. Additionally, on 15th February 2026, the Heads of State and Government of the AU High-Level Ad-Hoc Committee for South Sudan (C5) Plus convened at the sidelines of the 39th AU Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and deliberated on the situation in South Sudan. Specific outcomes of the Summit of the AU C5 Plus, contained in its Declaration, included an acknowledgement of the challenges facing South Sudan peace process; the centrality of the R-ARCSS as the only framework for achieving last peace, unity and stability in the country; a call for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, and adherence to the permanent ceasefire; a recommendation of an inclusive dialogue with all signatory parties to the R-ARCSS on elections, and that all the efforts of all peace actors in South Sudan (AU C5, IGAD and Tumaini) should be harmonized towards a peaceful end to the Transitional Period.

26. Subsequently, RJMEC leadership formally wrote a letter to the RTGoNU Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, conveying the main outcomes of the consultations with the various stakeholders, including the guidance from the AU C5 Plus Declaration for further consideration. By the end of the reporting period, RJMEC still awaited further response and decision from the RTGoNU on the way forward. In the meantime, RJMEC, together with IGAD, African Union Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), under the auspices of their Trilateral coordination platform, have been working on how to operationalise the AU C5 Plus Summit Declaration.

Formation of Leadership Body on Elections-Related Matters

27. On 30th January 2026, President Salva Kiir established, through a Presidential Decree, a leadership body¹ of the Parties and Stakeholders to the R-ARCSS to lead political dialogue and build consensus among political stakeholders on the December 2026 elections. The committee comprised the representatives of some Parties to the R-ARCSS, eminent personalities, stakeholders, and Civil Society actors. The committee was reportedly tasked to conduct political dialogue and draft a constitutional consensus blueprint on elections-related issues, including pre-elections matters, identify R-ARCSS provisions earmarked for post-elections consideration and address technical, legal and security prerequisites necessary for a conducive electoral environment.
28. In carrying out its work, the committee was expected to consult with the National Elections Commission and the Political Parties Council to ensure political resolutions align with existing legal and institutional frameworks. It was expected to report back to the presidency within 45 days from the start of the dialogue. The absence of the representatives of SPLM/A-IO led by Dr Riek Machar is feared to further fuel tensions and polarize the country. By the end of the quarter, however, the leadership body had not implemented its stated mandate.

The Executive of the RTGoNU

29. On 20th January 2026, President Salva Kiir unilaterally dismissed Hon. Angelina Teny (SPLM/A-IO), a woman, from the portfolio as the national Minister for Interior, and

¹ The Committee members included the following categories of officials: (a) *ITGoNU* (Dr. Akol Paul Kordit, Kuol Manyang Juuk, Aleu Ayieny Aleu, Africano Mande Gedima, Tut Gatluak Manime, Michael Makuei Lueth, Rizik Zachariah Hassan, Louis Lobong Lojore, Tor Deng Mawien, Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, Tulio Odongi, Lily Albino Akol Akol, Emmanuel Adil, Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro, Joseph Malek Arop, Taban Luka Guya, Pasqualina Philip Waden, Bol Tobi Maduot, Dhoruai Mabor Teny, Onyoti Adigo, Suheel Deng, Magot Maker Mayendit, and Dr. Mario Areng Wet); (b) *SPLM-IO* (Stephen Par Kuol, Lasuba Ludoru Wango, Agok Makur Kur, Sarah Cleto, James Mawich Makuach, Luke Thompson, Yar Telar Ring, Ding Lam Yual, and George Mutuar Mayom); (c) *SSOA* (Denay Jock Chagor, Gabriel Changson Chang, Hussein Abdelbagi Akol, Costello Garang Riiny Lual, Julius Daniel Tabule, Changkuoth Bichiok Reath, Moro Isaac Jenensio, and Clement Juba Bugoniwa); (d) *OPP* (Albino Akol Atak, Mayen Deng Alier, Richard Omony Valet, Martin Tako Moyi, Peter Mayen Majongdit, and Kornelio Kon Ngu); (e) *FDs* (Deng Alor Kuol, Madut Biar Yel, Isaiah Hakim Garang, Dr. Majak D'Agot, and Gier Chuang Aluong); (f) *Eminent Personalities* (His Eminence Cardinal Stephen Ameyu Mulla; Primate Archbishop Justin Badia Arama; Bishop Emeritus Enock Tombe Loro; Archbishop Daniel Garang Bul; Archbishop Elia Taban; Sheikh Abdallah Baraj Rual; Sheikh Juma Saeed Ali; Professor Francis Deng; Professor Moses Machar); and (g) *Stakeholders* (Alikayo Aligo Samson, Biel Butrus Biel, Edmund Yakani, Simon Akuei Deng, Alokir Malual, Mary Akech Bior, Sarah Nyanath Elijah, Rita M. Lopidia, Prof. Pauline Riak, Sheikh Mohammed Hassan Morjan, Steward Soro Budia, and Wilson Diongdit Sebit).

appointed Hon. Aleu Ayieny Aleu (ITGoNU), a man, as her successor. Previously, Hon. Aleu served as national Minister for Interior. On 23rd February 2026, Dr Bak Barnaba Chol (ITGoNU) was dismissed as the Minister of Finance and Planning after only three months in office, and was replaced by Hon. Salvatore Garang Mabiordit (ITGoNU), who served in the same portfolio before.

30. On 26th February 2026, H.E. Hussein Abdelbagi Akol (SSOA) was reinstated as Vice President (VP) and Chair for the Service Cluster, replacing H.E. Josephine Joseph Lagu (SSOA). H.E. Abdelbagi Akol, a leader within the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), was returned to the position he held from 2020 to early 2025 before being briefly replaced by H.E. Lagu. RJMEC notes, however, that some members of SSOA expressed opposition to H.E. Abdelbagi's reappointment, claiming they were not consulted, and that the appointed VP no longer represented the alliance. This development signals the need for SSOA to use its internal mechanisms as a means of amicably addressing any political differences.

The Transitional National Legislature

31. During the reporting period, the Transitional National Legislature (TNL), comprising the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA) and the Council of States, continued to sit and perform their respective functions. In the meantime, significant changes were observed at the leadership and membership levels of the two institutions. On 7th January 2026, 11 SPLM-IO members of the TNL affiliated with Dr Riek Machar were dismissed and subsequently replaced by new legislators aligned with the SPLM-IO led by Hon. Stephen Par Kuol, Minister for Peacebuilding. The SPLM-IO loyal to Dr Machar expressed their concerns that the replacements amounted to a unilateral purge of its members from the RTGoNU and violated the responsibility-sharing arrangements provided for in the R-ARCSS.
32. On 31st March 2026, the SPLM parliamentary caucus reportedly voted for a replacement of Rt. Hon. Jemma Nunu Kumba (ITGoNU) from her position as the Speaker of the reconstituted TNLA. Subsequently, Rt. Hon. Jemma Nunu, a woman who served in the same position since 2021, was replaced by Rt Hon. Joseph Ngere Paciko (ITGoNU), a man, as the new Speaker. Meanwhile, Rt Hon. Parmena Awerial Aluong (ITGoNU), 2nd Deputy Speaker for Administration and Finance, was replaced by Rt Hon. Abuk Payiti Ayik (ITGoNU). The same period further witnessed changes affecting the leadership of the Council of States, with Rt. Hon. Deng Deng Akoon (SPLM-IO), Speaker of the Council of State, relieved of his duty and replaced by Rt. Hon. Daniel Akot Akot (SPLM-IO led by Hon. Stephen Par Kuol) as the new Speaker.

Judicial Reforms

33. In terms of the judicial reforms process envisioned in the R-ARCSS, there has been no progress in implementing the report of the Judicial Reform Committee (JRC) since its submission to the RTGoNU way back in December 2024. Implementation requires, first, the reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to implement the requisite judicial reforms.

Legislative Reforms

34. In terms of the amendment of the Agreement-related laws, especially those reviewed and amended by the National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), no progress was registered during this reporting period. By the end of this quarter, the two Petroleum laws and the NGO Act 2016 (Amendment) Bills were all still pending various stages of enactment. The Petroleum Bills were still with the Cabinet, whereas the NGO Bill was before the Specialised Committee of the TNLA. Despite repeated recommendations for a review of the controversially enacted National Security Services (NSS) Bill, the process has equally stalled.

National Elections

35. Preparations for the envisaged December 2026 elections remain a central concern, as progress by the National Elections Commission (NEC) continues to lag behind the requirements of a credible and timely electoral process. While the NEC is operational, its effectiveness is significantly constrained by inadequate and unpredictable funding, which has limited its capacity to undertake critical preparatory tasks essential for the conduct of elections. Key elements of the electoral process, such as development of a comprehensive and credible voter register, a prerequisite for inclusive and transparent elections, remain outstanding.
36. The cumulative effect of these delays is increasingly problematic. With limited time remaining until the proposed elections date, the NEC faces mounting pressure to compress complex technical processes into an already constrained timeframe. This has heightened doubts about the feasibility of conducting elections that meet minimum standards of credibility, inclusiveness, and transparency. The persistent slippage in electoral timelines also reinforces broader uncertainty within the transition and risks normalizing delays as a default outcome. These challenges carry significant political implications. Without urgent corrective measures, including sustained funding, political support, review of the legal framework for elections, and enhanced coordination among stakeholders, the electoral process risks becoming a source of renewed political contention rather than a pathway toward democratic transition and long-term stability.

Chapter 2: Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements

Permanent Ceasefire

37. Regarding the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements, CTSAMVM reports indicate that violation of the Permanent Ceasefire by the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO and its allies continued unabated throughout the period of reporting. This is despite IGAD, RJMEC and the international community's call for the leadership of the RTGoNU and the SPLA-IO to dialogue and de-escalate the tensions. Between January and March 2026, CTSAMVM reported 133 alleged violations yet to be investigated. Although violations were reported in all the regions (Greater Equatoria, Greater Bhar el Ghazal, and Greater Upper Nile), the highest concentration of violations was in Jonglei State, especially in Ayod, Pigi, Nyirol and Akobo Counties.

38. Notwithstanding CTSAMVM's operational and logistical challenges, CTSAMVM investigated and confirmed eight (08) violations committed by the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO and allies in 2025, but reported in February and March 2026. Two (02) violations were attributed to the SSPDF, two (02) to the SPLA-IO and four (04) to both forces. In 2025, the SPLA-IO entered into a formal alliance with the National Salvation Front (NAS) of General Thomas Cirillo, constituting a violation of the R-ARCSS by the SPLA-IO since NAS is not a signatory to the R-ARCSS. However, it is commendable that there have been no reports alleging any violation of the Permanent Ceasefire by the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) forces since the current political and security crisis began.
39. It is noteworthy to highlight that during the quarter, CTSAMVM has been operating with only three (03) Monitoring and Verification Teams (MVTs) throughout the country. This has made it extremely challenging for CTSAMVM to monitor, investigate and report accurately and timely on all violations committed by the Parties throughout the country. Nevertheless, CTSAMVM managed, since January 2026, to monitor and record the aforementioned 133 alleged violations. These violations comprise armed clashes, crimes against civilians including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), forced displacement of civilians and the occupation of civilian areas by armed forces. CTSAMVM resumed regular meetings during the quarter and held two (02) CTSAMVM Technical Committee meetings, as well as two (02) Board meetings.
40. Conversely, all other R-ARCSS security mechanisms, which are expected to complement CTSAMVM operational efforts by providing joint command and control of forces in the field, and effective troubleshooting when incidents occur, have remained nonoperational since March 2025. These mechanisms are: the Joint Defence Board (JDB) charged with the responsibility of providing overall command and control of all forces, as well as remedial measures when ceasefire flareups occur; the Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) responsible for the direct command of units in the field and Cantonment Sites, as well as liaison with CTSAMVM senior HQs staff and MVTs; and the Joint Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) responsible for the management of training and Training Centers. Consequentially, the DDR Commission has not been able to implement its mandated tasks due to the lack of progress on the unification of forces. The RTGoNU also failed to fund the DDR Commission since its reestablishment.

Transitional Security Arrangements

41. Due to the severe violation of the Permanent Ceasefire between the SSPDF and the SPLA-IO in several parts of the country, the majority of the Cantonment Sites and Training Centers have collapsed, and the unification of forces has been halted, except for the integration of opposition elements who defected or surrendered to the SSPDF. The Necessary Unified Forces (NUF) that were deployed between 2023 and 2024 no longer exist as independent forces. Most soldiers who constituted those units returned to their unified mother units. Owing to the serious violation of the Permanent Ceasefire and the reversal of Phase I achievements, such as the graduation of 53,000 NUF and the deployment of approximately 8,000 army NUF troops, Phase II unification has not commenced. The JDB, which is supposed to manage the unification of forces, has not functioned for over a year, and the RTGoNU has not shown any serious effort to unify the forces as provided for in the R-ARCSS.

Chapter 3: Humanitarian Assistance and Reconstruction

Humanitarian Status

42. During the quarter, the humanitarian situation in the country continued to deteriorate as a result of various factors, including renewed fighting between some signatory Parties and their allies, forced displacement, intercommunal violence, economic and climate shocks in some parts of the country. By the end of the quarter, over 10 million people (two-thirds of the population), up from 9.5 million at the end of 2025, required some form of humanitarian assistance.
43. Hostilities continued on an upward trajectory across parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states, with reported airstrikes and armed clashes increasing pressure on South Sudan's humanitarian system. Currently, South Sudan has 2.5 million IDPs, with 376,000 newly displaced between early 2025 and the end of this reporting period, following renewed conflict. The International Organization for Migration estimates over 276,500 people were displaced across Jonglei, Lakes, Upper Nile, and Central Equatoria, with at least 110,000 fleeing Akobo to Ethiopia in early March 2026.
44. In addition to this, three years into the crisis in Sudan, over 1.36 million people, of which about 917,973 are South Sudanese nationals, have arrived in South Sudan by the end of the reporting period. The influx has had negative economic impacts on South Sudan and is pushing host communities and services to a breaking point. On 13 February, UNMISS handed over security and administrative responsibilities for the former Malakal PoC site, hosting nearly 45,000 people, to state authorities. As of 28 February, cholera outbreak remains widespread, with nearly 99,000 cases and 1,628 deaths reported across 55 counties, nine states and all three Administrative Areas since September 2024. Outbreaks persist in overcrowded displacement sites in central and northern Jonglei, where gaps in water, sanitation and health services remain severe.
45. Rising political polarization at national level has fuelled widespread violence across Upper Nile, Jonglei, Unity, and Western and Central Equatoria resulting in civilian casualties. For example, in February, local authorities reported that 25 people were killed in Ayod County in Jonglei State, shortly after displaced families had been encouraged to return home with assurances of assistance. In the same month of February in Terekeka County in Central Equatoria State, land-related inter-communal violence left several people dead and displaced over 11,000 people, mostly women and children. In Unity State, heavy shelling on 12 and 13 February in Bentiu and Rubkona displaced nearly 1,000 civilians towards the IDP camps, according to IOM tracking. In Upper Nile State, ongoing fighting displaced some 10,000 people from Baliet County on 25 February, including 2,600 who relocated to Malakal Town. In early March 2026, armed youth from Mayom in Unity attacked Abiemnhom in Ruweng Administrative Area, reportedly killing over 200 people and displacing about 20,000 into Abyei Administrative Area. Also in March 2026 in Mundri East, Western Equatoria, cattle-related attacks killed dozens, displaced more than 8,000, and resulted in livestock theft. Intercommunal violence in Tonj North, Warrap State, killed 20 people and forced 500 to flee.
46. The most affected region was central and northern Jonglei State due to renewed clashes between the SSPDF and SPLA-IO. In January 2026, SSPDF ordered civilians and humanitarian staff to relocate from Northern and Central Jonglei due to planned military

operations. The ensuing fighting resulted in loss of life and destruction of civilian and humanitarian infrastructure. In early March 2026, Akobo County in Jonglei State became the center of a rapidly escalating security and humanitarian crisis. On 2nd March 2026, an UNMISS convoy traveling from Akobo to Pibor was ambushed. On 6th March 2026, the SSPDF issued a 72-hour ultimatum, ordering civilians, UNMISS personnel, UN agencies, and NGOs to leave Akobo ahead of a planned military operation. Despite repeated warnings from civil society and the diplomatic community about the risks to civilians, clashes eventually broke out in Akobo town, and the SSPDF took control of Akobo town.

47. Across Jonglei State, the destruction and looting of health facilities, critical health workforce shortages, and repeated interruptions to cold chain systems have significantly reduced access to essential health services for approximately 1.35 million people. At least 26 health facilities have reportedly been destroyed or looted since the escalation of the conflict. An estimated 114,000 persons were internally displaced across at least eight locations (Dengjok, Gakdong, Nyandit, Old Akobo, Dilulle, Nyikhan, Dibole, and Wechguak) within Akobo County; further, an estimated 110,000 have reportedly fled across the border into Ethiopia.
48. On the overall, health facilities in parts of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile States closed following looting and, in some cases, were burnt, resulting in the loss of medicine and health equipment. These areas also saw the relocation of humanitarian staff, closure of health facilities, suspension of critical health, nutrition, WASH and protection services. Further, the environment remained volatile for humanitarian actors and saw an increase in bureaucratic impediments and politicization of humanitarian access, all of which continue to undermine delivery and humanitarian operations.

Chapter 4: Resource Economic and Financial Management

Resource Management

Petroleum

49. Oil production in the Dar Blend and Nile Blend oil fields continued, with an average output of 155,000 barrels per day. The Government utilized its entitlement to offset advances previously provided to support its budget. These advances, taken in lieu of oil cargoes from purchasing companies, were transacted at discounted rates, resulting in proceeds below market value for the oil. The Republic of Sudan consistently received an average of 6,000 barrels per day (Dar Blend) from South Sudan's daily government entitlement, compared to a total of 28,000 barrels per day, as outlined in Article 2.1 of the Agreement for Supply and Purchase of Government of South Sudan Oil Entitlement Volumes by the Government of the Republic of Sudan (SPA), since only the Kosti Power Plant remains operational.

Public Financial Management

Revenue collection

50. Non-oil revenue continues to rise, with more than eighty percent coming from personal income tax in the private sector and customs duties and fees. Duty exemption procedures

have been digitalized, and an Anti-Smuggling Unit Office has been established in Nimule, an important international trade corridor. There has also been notable progress on building the Inland Customs Clearance Area (ICCA) in Nimule's Jalle Area. In Juba, the SSRA has expanded its physical space to improve public access. Additionally, the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) – a consumption tax applied at each stage of production—remains underway.

51. The SSRA is implementing Digital Tax Stamps, which are physical stamps embedded with unique digital codes that are affixed to designated products. These codes enable consumers, the SSRA, and manufacturers to authenticate products and monitor their movement throughout the supply chain. Digital Tax Stamps play a vital role in facilitating excise duty collection for the SSRA, promoting transparency in tax administration, and combating illicit trade.
52. The Authority faces challenges enforcing the sales tax regime due to Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) and transfer pricing. BEPS involves shifting profits to low or no-tax jurisdictions by exploiting gaps in tax rules, which complicates South Sudan's efforts to tax income generated within its borders. Although legal, these practices reduce tax fairness and government revenue. Many existing tax laws are outdated and conflict with regional (EAC) frameworks, highlighting the need for legislative review and updates.

The 2025/2026 FY budget

53. The Minister of Finance and Planning presented South Sudan's Draft Fiscal Year 2025–2026 National Budget to the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, outlining a strategy focused on economic stabilization through rebuilding foreign exchange reserves and reducing inflation. The plan relies heavily on the resumption of oil exports as the main driver of recovery, with GDP projected at SSP 20.6 trillion (about USD 4.5 billion). Although this reflects a nominal decline due to earlier oil disruptions, strong growth is expected, particularly in the oil sector, which is projected to expand by 37.8%, while the non-oil sector is forecast to grow by 5.5%.
54. Inflation, currently around 15%, remains a major concern and is linked to supply constraints and pressure on the exchange rate. The government plans to pursue an anti-inflationary fiscal policy, rebuild reserves in the second half of the year, and manage the fiscal deficit through grants and concessional financing aligned with public financial management reforms. A notable positive development is the sharp drop in commercial bank lending rates, which is expected to improve credit access and support private sector-led growth.
55. The budget was presented seven months later than stipulated and did not adhere to the requirements set forth by the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act 2011, as amended in 2025. According to the Act, an Appropriation Bill must be submitted to the Assembly, including proposals for taxes, fees, and other levies, as well as provisions for borrowing, investment, or savings bonds, categorized as financial bills.

The Public Financial Management Oversight Committee

56. The Public Financial Management Oversight Committee (PFM OC) reviewed how the first Phase I (2020–2025) of South Sudan's Public Financial Management Reform Strategy (PFMRS) was put into action, focusing on progress, obstacles, and lessons

learned to guide the design and execution of Phase II. The Strategy developed by the PFM OC is rooted in Chapter IV of the R-ARCSS and supports the Revised National Development Strategy. This phase emphasized “getting the basics right,” covering treasury operations, IFMIS, payroll, procurement, budget execution, and oversight institutions.

57. According to an independent evaluation, overall results were only partly successful. There was notable progress with technically oriented reforms such as Treasury Single Account (TSA) development, IFMIS upgrades and rollouts, and updates to procurement legal frameworks. However, areas that are politically sensitive—including arrears verification and clearance, anti-corruption measures, and intergovernmental fiscal transfers—lagged, particularly since the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission remains non-operational.
58. Frequent changes in leadership, poor enforcement, and fragmented implementation slowed reform momentum. As a result, many reforms have been initiated but lack full operational status. While legal and institutional frameworks are in place, actual implementation, enforcement, and sustainability continue to be limited. Progress varies noticeably and is strongly reliant on donor support, as government financing has been minimal, which undermines ownership, continuity, and long-term sustainability.

Enterprise Development

59. The Women’s Enterprise Development Bill and Youth Enterprise Development Bill, intended to support domestic private sector growth by enhancing capacity and improving access to finance, have not yet been presented to parliament. RJMEC urges the responsible ministries to ensure that these Funds are institutionalized as mandated by the R-ARCSS to ensure the development of the domestic private sector in South Sudan.

Chapter 5: Transitional Justice, Accountability, Reconciliation and Healing

60. According to section 10(2) of the CTRH Act, the Selection Panel was required to receive applications from interested candidates, compile a shortlist for suitable applicants to be interviewed. Further, the Panel was required to make available the shortlisted candidates to the media and invite the public to comments on the suitability of the shortlisted candidates. The Selection Panel was also required to vet the nominees, interview them and privately rank them according to criteria. Finally, the Panel was required to select the four South Sudanese national commissioners and publicly release the names of the four (which should include at least one woman).
61. Thereafter, the Panel, as per Section 10 (3) of the Act, was required to transmit the names of the four South Sudanese nationals to the Minister, who is thereafter required to submit these names to the executive for approval. According to Section 12 (2) of the Act, the Executive is required to submit the list of nominees to the TNLA for vetting and approval.
62. During this reporting period, there was some progress in the CTRH process. On 23rd of January 2026, the Selection Panel chaired by Dr Jackline Warrile, submitted nominees to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for consideration for appointment as Commissioners to the Commission for Truth, Reconciliation Commission (CTRH). This

submission of names was made after the Panel invited applications to fill the four South Sudanese reserved positions as CTRH Commissioners. It is reported that 127 applicants applied for the positions, resulting in a shortlisting of 47 qualified persons who were then subjected to a competitive interview process, leading to the submission of the final nominees.

63. The Selection Panel is yet to comply with the CTRH Act, which requires that they publicly release the names of the four nominees. Further, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, on behalf of the Executive, is now required to submit the list of nominees to the TNLA for vetting and approval as required by the CTRH Act.
64. As concerns the recruitment of the three non-South Sudanese CTRH Commissioners, the African Union Commission Chairperson, in consultations with the United Nations, established a rigorous recruitment process. Part of the process involved a joint AU-UN taskforce supported by a technical expert committee that invited applicants, scrutinized suitable candidates and shortlisted several of them for interview. In the end, it is reported that the task force has completed its work and made recommendations on suitable candidates to the AUC leadership.
65. The AUC Chair is now expected to submit 6 names to the RTGoNU for their consideration, out of which three persons are to be chosen (including at least one woman).
66. On HCSS and CRA, there was no progress registered during this reporting period. The HCSS was specifically to be established within the Transitional Period as an independent hybrid judicial court with a mandate to investigate and, where necessary, prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for violations of international law and/or applicable South Sudanese law committed from 15th December 2013 until the end of the Transitional Period. During this quarter, violations against South Sudanese laws and international humanitarian law were reported to have been committed by state and non-state actors. The HCSS establishment is therefore necessary to allow independent investigations and prosecution of those bearing the greatest responsibility for such violations.

Chapter 6: Parameters of Permanent Constitution

67. In terms of the permanent constitution-making process, some progress was made during this reporting period. The reconstituted National Constitutional Review Commission (R-NCRC) continued its civic education and public consultation activities within the States and Administrative Areas. Following the public launch of civic education and public consultation in Juba on the 27th March 2025, the NCRC has so far conducted the first phase of civic education and public consultation in all the 10 states and 01 administrative area. The team are currently in Pibor, which leaves only Ruweng and Abeyi to complete this phase.

Chapter 7: Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission

68. Pursuant to its mandate under Article 7.9 of the R-ARCSS, the RJMEC significantly intensified its diplomatic and political engagements at the national, regional, and international levels in response to the deteriorating political and security situation in South Sudan. These engagements were aimed at arresting escalating political and security

tensions, preserving the integrity of the R-ARCSS, and mobilising coordinated support for a return to full and inclusive implementation of the Agreement.

69. RJMEC leadership intensified high-level consultations with a broad range of stakeholders to build consensus and mobilise support for the full implementation of the R-ARCSS. These engagements included consultations with RJMEC members; non-resident Ambassadors accredited to South Sudan but based in Ethiopia; representatives of the AU C5, including senior political leadership, Foreign Ministers, and Ambassadors; the Ethiopian Minister for Foreign Affairs; the Chair of the IGAD Council of Ministers; and the Chair of IGAD.
70. The consultations focused on assessing the evolving political and security situation, exploring pathways for de-escalation and restoration of the Permanent Ceasefire, advancing all-inclusive dialogue, addressing proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS, preserving the supremacy and sanctity of the Agreement, and ensuring a coordinated regional and international response. Stakeholders broadly underscored the importance of unified messaging and collective pressure to prevent further erosion of the peace process.
71. In January, RJMEC briefed the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), reiterating key priority concerns arising from the implementation of the R-ARCSS. The briefing reinforced RJMEC's call for immediate de-escalation of tensions, adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire, the pursuit of an all-inclusive political dialogue, and the need for urgent resolution of the situation concerning the First Vice President. The briefing sought to maintain sustained continental attention and support for the South Sudan peace process.
72. In addition, RJMEC briefed the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to Article 7.9 of the R-ARCSS, on the worsening political and security environment in South Sudan and the resulting implications for the implementation of the R-ARCSS. The briefing underscored the heightened risk of a relapse into widespread conflict and the urgent need for international engagement to stabilise the situation. RJMEC therefore appealed to the Security Council to prevail upon the South Sudanese authorities and all Parties to the Agreement to immediately halt hostilities, de-escalate tensions, and restore full adherence to the Permanent Ceasefire. It emphasised the necessity of recommitting to the full implementation of the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for restoring peace and stability. In that regard, it recommended that the Council encourages and supports an inclusive political dialogue to address the prevailing political impasse in a manner consistent with the letter and spirit of the R-ARCSS.
73. Furthermore, RJMEC engaged its members and the regional guarantors on the proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS and TCRSS, 2011 (as amended) by the RTGoNU. As aforementioned about the outcomes of the consultations, concerns were expressed that initiatives to amend provisions of the Agreement to enable elections in December 2026 should be conducted through an inclusive and consultative process involving all signatory Parties, stakeholders, and guarantors, and should aim at preserving the sanctity and supremacy of the R-ARCSS.

III. Key Observations and Recommendations

Observations

74. A central observation arising from the report is the deep concern with the prevailing political and security challenges facing implementation of the R-ARCSS, which call for urgency of preventing their further deterioration. The persistence of armed confrontations, localized violence, and heightened political tensions underscores the need for an immediate and unconditional cessation of hostilities. Continued clashes threaten civilian protection and humanitarian access and undermine confidence in the R-ARCSS, as the primary framework for stability. Without a sustained cessation of hostilities, progress on governance reforms, electoral preparations, and transitional justice remains fragile and reversible.
75. Closely linked to the security situation is the evident deficit in political trust among key actors. Unilateral actions, limited consultation, and recurring confrontations have weakened the consensus-based foundations of the peace agreement. In this context, the need for an inclusive political dialogue has become increasingly pronounced. Such dialogue is essential for de-escalating tensions and addressing unresolved political questions that continue to impede the transition. The absence of structured, inclusive engagement risks entrenching polarisation and narrowing the political space at a time when broad participation is critical.
76. In that regard, the recent African Union C5 Plus Declaration provides an important framework for addressing these challenges. Its emphasis on inclusive dialogue reflects recognition that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through narrow elite bargaining alone. In that regard, meaningful dialogue must include signatory and non-signatory political actors, women, youth, civil society, faith-based leaders, and other stakeholders. An inclusive process, pursued in good faith, offers an opportunity to rebuild confidence, reaffirm commitment to the R-ARCSS, and generate consensus on the way forward, particularly with regard to elections and the remaining transitional tasks.
77. Another key observation concerns the interlinkages between insecurity, humanitarian conditions, and political processes. Ongoing hostilities continue to drive displacement, restrict humanitarian access, and expose civilians and aid workers to heightened security risks. These conditions exacerbate human suffering, constrain civic participation and political engagement, thereby undermining the credibility of the planned electoral process. Progress towards peace and democratic transition, therefore, requires concerted efforts towards the stabilisation of the security environment and protection of civilians.

Recommendations

78. In light of the above, the following measures are proposed for consideration by the Parties to the Agreement and relevant stakeholders, including the Executive of the RTGoNU, TNL, IGAD, the African Union, and the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan, to reinforce adherence to the R-ARCSS, mitigate the risk of renewed conflict, and support the timely conduct of elections at the end of December 2026:

a. To the Parties to the Agreement and Relevant Stakeholders:

- Renew commitment to full implementation of outstanding Agreement tasks, including the allocation of adequate and predictable funding to Agreement institutions and mechanisms; and
- engage in a dialogue and recommit to the Permanent Ceasefire and consider a proactive approach to accelerate the unification of forces in order to facilitate the planned elections at the end of 2026.

b. To the Executive of the RTGoNU:

- Strictly adhere to the legal procedure for amending the R-ARCSS, in particular Article 1.9.4 on initiating amendments to the R-ARCSS and follow the due process under Article 8.4;
- de-escalate tensions and urgently embark on inclusive and meaningful dialogue to address the current political/security deadlocks and by consensus agree on a practical and expedited roadmap to elections by the end of the Transitional Period;
- avail sufficient funding to the NEC, security mechanisms as well as to the NCRC in a timely manner to enable it roll out the civic education and public consultation campaigns to all parts of the country;
- expedite implementation of the JRC report and its recommendation, especially the review and amendment of the Judiciary Act and reconstitution of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to implement the reforms;
- expedite the return of the controversial National Security Services Act to the TNLA for reconsideration;
- collate all the seven nominees for the CTRH and submit their names to the TNLA for vetting and approval and eventual appointment by the President; and
- consider providing dedicated funding for the implementation of Transitional Security Arrangements.

c. To the TNL:

- Continue exercising enhanced oversight role to ensure that any proposed amendments to the R-ARCSS are subjected to broad, inclusive consultation involving all signatory Parties, stakeholders, and guarantors. In that regard, the TNL should guard against unilateral actions that risk undermining the integrity and core commitments of the Agreement, particularly those relating to political inclusivity and elections;
- support an all-inclusive political dialogue aimed at de-escalating tensions and addressing the prevailing political impasse in line with the recent AU C5 Plus Declaration;
- prioritize the passage of election-related legislation and ensure adequate budgetary allocations to the National Elections Commission to enable timely and credible preparations for the December 2026 elections;

- enhance its oversight role in relation to the protection of civilians and humanitarian access, including through regular hearings and engagements with relevant ministries and humanitarian actors, to ensure that legislative action supports improved humanitarian conditions; and
- expedite the enactment of the NGO Amendment Bill to create the necessary civic and political space needed for the conduct of elections.

d. To IGAD:

- Consider convening an extra-ordinary Council of Ministers meeting on the deteriorating political and security situation in South Sudan and guide the RTGoNU on much-needed steps to address and restore full adherence and implementation of the R-ARCSS in letter and spirit, including the matter of amendments to the R-ARCSS;
- consider undertaking a joint IGAD ministerial visit to South Sudan to collectively engage with the leadership of the Parties to the R-ARCSS and RTGoNU as guarantor, to follow up on IGAD's recommendations to the RTGoNU;
- continue urging the SSPDF and SPLA-IO leadership to immediately de-escalate tensions, disengage their forces and return to their pre-incident positions;
- launch a truly inclusive political dialogue among signatory parties to reach consensus on the nature, sequencing, and modalities of the elections. In that regard, further engage the non-signatory groups to ensure inclusivity and sustainability of the peace process; and
- urge the RTGoNU to reverse unilateral decisions that contravene the provisions of the R-ARCSS.

e. To the African Union:

- Pursuant to the AU C5 Plus Declaration, the AU and IGAD to consider using their joint leverage on the leadership in South Sudan to encourage them to urgently de-escalate tensions, cease hostilities, and stop actions that result in a return to all-out war;
- avail effective support to the appointed AU High Representative to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea to expedite the convening of an inclusive political dialogue among signatory parties to reach consensus on the nature, sequencing, and modalities of the scheduled elections;
- engage non-signatory groups to ensure inclusivity in the political dialogue and sustainability of the peace process;
- the AUC to consider submitting the names of the six CTRH nominees to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs for the RTGoNU's approval;
- the AUC to further encourage expeditious establishment and funding of the R-ARCS transitional justice institutions to help bring about national reconciliation; and
- encourage the AUC to take proactive steps in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan.

f. To the United Nations:

- The members of the Security Council to consider undertaking periodic field visits to Juba to engage with the Parties to the R-ARCSS and the RTGoNU in the pursuit of durable peace in the Republic of South Sudan;
- the Security Council should urge all Parties to immediately cease hostilities, de-escalate tensions, and fully adhere to the Permanent Ceasefire as a prerequisite for stabilising the political and security situation;
- the Council should encourage and support an inclusive political dialogue, consistent with the AU C5 Plus Declaration, to address the current political impasse and outstanding issues within the framework of the R-ARCSS; and
- further, the Council should continue to press for improved protection of civilians, unhindered humanitarian access, and accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including pressing for the removal of administrative and security-related impediments to humanitarian access.

g. To the International Partners and Friends of South Sudan:

- Consider supporting an inclusive political dialogue, in line with the African Union C5 Declaration, as a means of fostering consensus among South Sudanese stakeholders on critical transitional and elections-related matters;
- International Partners are urged to scale up and sustain flexible humanitarian assistance to communities affected by conflict, displacement, and food insecurity in order to address immediate protection needs, ensure access to basic services, and mitigate the humanitarian consequences of ongoing insecurity; and
- further consider the provision of technical and logistical support to the NCRC and the constitution-making process, including by directly funding some of the critical mechanisms and civic education.

IV. Conclusion

79. Overall, the report shows that implementation of the R-ARCSS remains slow, fragile and uneven, with progress constrained by persistent political and security violations, insecurity, limited trust among the Parties, weak compliance with agreed commitments, and serious funding limitations. Although some limited political, institutional, and technical developments were recorded during the period, they did not translate into meaningful advancement across the core transitional priorities as required.
80. The continued violation of the Permanent Ceasefire by some of the signatory parties with armed wings, the lack of progress on Transitional Security Arrangements, the deteriorating humanitarian situation, and the slow pace of transitional reforms in governance, public financial management, transitional justice and constitution-making processes, and delayed inclusive political dialogue, all point to a peace process under significant strain. These challenges continue to erode public confidence and heighten the risk of further instability.

81. In this context, the report underscores the urgent need for the Parties to recommit to the full implementation of the R-ARCSS, halt hostilities, and engage in inclusive dialogue to address outstanding political and security concerns. Sustained political will, cooperation among stakeholders, and support from regional and international partners are essential to prevent further deterioration and preserve the sanctity and supremacy of the R-ARCSS as well as the prospects for a peaceful and democratic transition in South Sudan.
82. In accordance with Chapter VII of the R-ARCSS, the RJMEC reaffirms its commitment to continue monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS. As circumstances require, it will continue to assist the parties to break any deadlock that may arise during the implementation of the Agreement. It will continue to regularly provide reports and briefings to the Executive of the RTGoNU, the reconstituted TNLA, the Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and the Secretary General and the Security Council of the United Nations.
83. Finally, RJMEC reaffirms its continued commitment to supporting the Parties to the R-ARCSS and accompanying the peace process in accordance with its mandate, and calls upon all stakeholders to sustain their efforts toward the achievement of lasting peace and stability in South Sudan.

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